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ABSTRACT
The occupational structure of an establishment provides a description of its production
process by detailing the distribution and relative intensity of tasks performed. In this paper, I
investigate whether there are substantive differences in the occupational structures of low- and
high-wage service sector establishments. I show that low-wage establishments organize
production to use less labor in professional occupations compared to high-wage establishments
operating in the same local-labor market and industry. In addition, low-wage establishments
employ fewer individuals in information technology occupations, employ fewer managers, and
have substantially wider supervisory spans of control. These results indicate that, despite
operating in the same narrowly defined labor and product markets, low-wage establishments
organize production to less intensively use labor in skilled occupations.
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Since the late 1970s, wages for the lowest-earning employees in the United States have
stagnated, barely increasing until about 2014 (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Autor [2011]).
This has led to growing interest for the role of public policy in ensuring employed individuals
earn enough to afford a minimal standard of living, with 34 city and other local areas passing
local minimum wage ordinances between 2004 and 2014 (Vaghul and Zipperer 2016).
However, at the establishment level, there is substantial variation in the extent to which a
given minimum wage increase binds. For instance, in the sample of service sector establishments
I study in this paper, the bottom 10 percent of establishments pay wages below $8.07 per hour to
their lowest-paid decile of employees, while the top 10 percent of establishments pay wages
above $21.14 to their bottom decile. Thus, for local areas considering minimum wages of $15 an
hour, a large fraction of service sector establishments will find few if any of their employees
affected by such a minimum wage increase. At the other extreme, 10 percent of establishments
pay over 90 percent of their employees below $13.15. For this minority of establishments, a $15
per hour minimum wage would impact nearly all their employees.
Why are there such differences in the wages establishments pay to their lowest-paid
workers? I focus on three possible explanations. First, it could be that there are no productivity
differences between low- and high-wage establishments operating in the same industry and
geographic market, but high-wage firms choose to share more of the economic rents with their
employees. Second, it could be that low- and high-wage establishments choose to distribute rents
within the firm differently. In particular, high-wage firms may have more wage compression,
leading to a flatter wage hierarchy within the firm. In both cases, low- and high-wage
establishments should appear otherwise similar except for differences in the wage structure. If
the only difference between low-wage and high-wage establishments is the wage structure, it is
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more likely that minimum wage increases will only induce changes in the distribution of rents
between workers and the employer, rather than inducing firms to change the production process.
On the other hand, there may be substantive differences in the production process
between low- and high-wage establishments, leading low-wage establishments to be less
productive and, accordingly, pay lower wages. In this case, low-wage establishments may have
less capacity to pay higher wages without reorganizing the production process. Depending on
whether these differences are due to organizational choices versus permanent heterogeneity in
productivity between establishments, sufficiently large minimum wage increases will force these
less-productive establishments to either adapt or exit the market.
To distinguish between these three explanations for wage heterogeneity, I measure the
wage and occupational structure of establishments, comparing low- and high-wage
establishments operating in the same narrowly defined market. By examining the wage structure,
I can investigate whether establishments that pay low wages to the bottom 10 percent of their
employees also pay lower wages throughout the hierarchy. To measure heterogeneity in the
production process, I focus on the occupational structure of establishments. Occupations provide
a description of the tasks an individual employee performs; thus, the types of occupations an
establishment employs and the number of employees in each occupation provide a description of
the production tasks performed in the establishment as a whole.
I use data from the May 2016 wave of the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey to
measure heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments. I focus on service sector
establishments because the service sector is disproportionately low wage (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2016a). I answer two related research questions. First, I measure how much of variation
in bottom-decile pay can be explained by fixed characteristics, including industry, geography,
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and establishment size. After demonstrating that these fixed characteristics can explain at most
half of the variation in 10th percentile wages, I investigate sources of organizational
heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments. Focusing on variation within
narrowly defined industry by geographic area cells, I find that establishments that pay low wages
to their bottom 10 percent of employees also pay low wages throughout the hierarchy. However,
these differences in hourly pay are roughly constant throughout the wage hierarchy, leading to
more within-establishment wage inequality for low-wage establishments. These results are
inconsistent with the view that low-wage establishments pay low-wages at the bottom in order to
pay higher wages further up the hierarchy.
I find substantial variation in occupational structure between low- and high-wage
establishments. Low-wage establishments employ fewer individuals in professional occupations
and more individuals in service, clerical, and production occupations. Low-wage establishments
have fewer managers but more supervisors, leading to a wider span of control throughout the
hierarchy. Finally, low-wage establishments employ fewer individuals in information technology
(IT) occupations.
These results offer important context for understanding low-wage labor markets. The fact
that almost half of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs within industry by geographic
cells demonstrates that many establishments can productively pay higher-wages to the bottom of
their hierarchy. However, the fact that low-wage establishments appear to be organized with a
very different distribution of occupations indicates that there are substantive differences in how
low- and high-wage establishments organize their production within the same industry.
Moreover, the nature of the organizational differences suggests that low-wage establishments
may in fact be less productive. The fact that low-wage establishments employ fewer professional
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occupations (which are typically high-skill cognitive occupations), as well as fewer IT
occupations, indicates that low-wage establishments produce using a less skill-intensive and
technology-intensive production process. Such results offer suggestive evidence that wage
heterogeneity between establishments may be due to substantive differences in productivity.

LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper contributes to a growing literature documenting heterogeneity between
seemingly similar establishments. A variety of papers have documented dispersion in
characteristics, including total factor productivity (Syverson 2004), management practices
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), and wages (Song, Price, and Bloom 2016). Across this literature,
it is clear that firms with very different production processes are able to coexist within markets;
however, there is some evidence that dispersion is narrower when there is more market
competition (e.g., Syverson 2004).
There are several factors that have been shown to relate to wage heterogeneity between
establishments. The firm-size wage premium has been well-established (e.g., Troske 1999).
Wages may also differ between establishments due to sorting, especially if there are
complementarities between the firm’s production technology and worker productivity, or
complementarities between workers (see, for instance, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis [1999]).
Wage dispersion also appears to relate to persistent productivity differences across
establishments (Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer 2007).
This paper presents a new method to measure heterogeneity in the production process, by
using the occupational structure of the establishment. Several papers examine related measures.
Maurin and Thesmar (2004) find that the adoption of technology in manufacturing firms is
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associated with a reduction in the share of employment in production occupations and
administrative occupations and an increase in the share employed in design and marketing
occupations. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) find higher productivity for firms that
adopt IT and organize their workforce in a decentralized fashion. Rajan and Wulf (2006)
examine the hierarchy for upper-management positions and find that firms have become
increasingly flat in recent years. This may be associated with decentralization, especially because
this flattening is associated with greater compensation for these managers who now have a
broader span of control; however, this flattening also means that top executives have closer
contact with more of their subordinates. Thus, there is reason to believe that low- and high-wage
establishments may have different occupation and management structures and that this may be
related to the adoption of IT.
In addition, this paper relates to a large literature on the effect of the minimum wage on
labor markets. A robust subliterature has focused on comparing the effect of minimum wage
increases on establishments that paid below and above the new minimum wage before the policy
was enacted (see, for instance, Card and Krueger [1994]; Dube, Naidu, and Reich [2007]). This
paper can shed light on why we see such heterogeneity within markets in the first place. There is
little evidence that minimum wage increases lead firms to exit the market (see Belman and
Wolfson 2015); however, there does appear to be employment spillovers to workers who should
not have been directly affected by the legislation, suggesting firms may reorganize production in
response to minimum wage increase (Cengiz et al. 2017; Jardim et al. 2017). This relates to a
classic literature on labor-labor substitution, which emphasizes how minimum wage policies may
lead to spillovers in the labor market (e.g., Hamermesh and Grant 1979).
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METHODOLOGY
The primary methodological innovation of this paper is to use the occupational structure
as a measure for the production process of the establishment. The Standard Occupational
Classification system (SOC) classified occupations primarily based on the work performed in the
job (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Thus, the distribution of employment across occupational
categories provides a description of the work performed at the establishment. Although six-digit
occupational categories provide less information than a job title or a job description, the
occupational system provides a common categorization across establishments. This allows us to
compare occupational structure between establishments.

DATA
I use data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey, a semiannual
survey of establishments.1 The OES survey is designed to produce high-quality estimates of
occupational wages across industries and geography. This survey reaches approximately 200,000
establishments every six months. I use data from the first wave of 2016, which was collected in
the second quarter of 2016. The OES is designed to be nationally representative and is a random
sample stratified by metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area, industry, and establishment size
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016b). The final sample for May 2016 includes 195,691
establishments, employing over 3.4 million employees. This represents approximately 1.3
percent of all U.S. employment in May 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016c).
1

Note that establishments are either a firm with a single location or a particular location of a
multiestablishment firm. Due to the way the data are collected, the basic unit of analysis is the establishment, rather
than the firm.
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The OES survey has a unique structure in which each establishment reports the number
of employees in each cell of a matrix consisting of detailed occupational categories crossed with
12 wage bins (see Appendix Table A1 for the precise wage intervals). This allows for the
construction of occupational structure variables, which are unavailable in other major data
sources in the United States. Nonetheless, the data have several limitations. Crucially, there is no
worker-level information beyond the employment count within each cell. In addition, the OES
definition of employment includes all full-time and part-time workers, as well as workers on
leave, which may skew employment patterns for establishments that rely more heavily on parttime labor.
The wages reported in the OES include regular wages, tips, and bonuses, but exclude
extra pay, such as overtime. The primary wage variable I will focus on is the 10th percentile
establishment wage, which represents the wage bin in which the 10th percentile employee is
employed. For establishments of 10 or fewer employees, this is the lowest paid employee. To
assign a single wage to the range of wages in each wage bin, I use the internal OES-produced
interpolated average wage for the bin, which is constructed using data from the National
Compensation Survey.
I restrict my analysis to service sector establishments, which includes establishments in
the industries listed in Table 1. This follows the definition used by the Census Quarterly Services
Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Since I am interested in the occupational structure within
establishments, I restrict my analysis to establishments with at least five employees. This cuts the
sample to 91,673 establishments. In Table 2 I report means, standard deviations, and 10th and
90th percentiles for key dependent variables.
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To compare between low- and high-wage establishments, the first step is to define the
cells within which to compare. I define cells based on six-digit industry code (NAICS) and 712
commuting zones. I follow Tolbert and Sizer (1996) in defining commuting zones, which consist
of contiguous aggregates of counties based on historic commuting patterns. For less than 2
percent of the data, either the county is missing or the establishment is located in an area that is
not part of the defined commuting zones.2 In this case, I construct a “balance” commuting zone
for every state or territory. All results are robust to excluding data from these balance commuting
zones or using metropolitan statistical areas as the geographic area.
I create three subsamples of the data, the largest of which includes all service sector
establishments with at least 5 employees and includes 91,673 establishments. The second
subsample restricts the sample to establishments that are in the same commuting zone by
industry cell as two other establishments, which reduces the sample to 49,578 establishments.
The final subsample restricts the sample to establishments in cells of 10 establishments, which
further reduces the sample to 15,690. These two restricted subsamples allow me to determine if
an establishment is low- or high-wage within its narrowly defined market. Figure 1 represents
the distribution of commuting zones that are present in the smallest subsample of data.

SPECIFICATIONS
The goal of this paper is to examine the characteristics of heterogeneity in low-wage
compensation across establishments. The first question is how much of that variation can be
explained by industry or geography. In Figure 2, I show how 10th percentile establishment wages
2

Commuting zones are defined for the 50 U.S. states. The OES also covers the District of Columbia,
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
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vary across two-digit industries. Here we see that Utilities have the highest 10th percentile
wages, on average over $30 per hour, while Accommodation and Food Services have 10th
percentile wages of under $10 per hour. Similarly, local prices, minimum wage laws, and other
characteristics of geographic areas mean that wages may vary substantially across commuting
zones.
To address this, I run a series of specifications with fixed effects and report the R-squared
statistic. In particular, I regress
log(𝑤10)𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝑔  +  𝜀𝑖𝑔
where 𝑙og(𝑤10)𝑖𝑐 is the logarithm of the 10th percentile wages for establishment 𝑖 in group 𝑔.
Group 𝑔 is successively defined as six-digit industry, commuting zones, nine establishment size
bins, and the interaction of industry by commuting zone. Specifically, I divide establishments
into the following size categories: 5–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–74, 75–99, 100–499, 500–749, 750–
1999, and 2000 plus. I report the R-squared and adjusted R-squared, which measures the fraction
the variation in log 10th percentile wages is reduced by including each set of fixed effects. I run
this specification on the three samples of the data. Specifications are weighted using the OES
sampling weights, and standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level.
After I establish that a substantial fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs
within industry by commuting zone cells, I then examine how wage and occupational structures
differ between low- and high-wage establishments within these industries by commuting zone
cells. I divide cells by median 10th percentile wages, defining establishments that pay below
median wages as low-wage and those that pay median or above wages as high-wage. I estimate
the following linear regression:
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑖  +  𝛾𝑐  +  𝜀𝑖𝑐
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where 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑐 is a series of dependent variables for establishment 𝑖 in cell𝑐 that is either low-wage
(𝐼𝑖 = 1) or not. I run the specifications on the 3-establishment cell and 10-establishment cell
subsamples. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level and each specification is
weighted by OES sampling weights.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
To summarize establishment-level compensation practices and occupational structure, I
construct a variety of statistics. First, I construct the logarithm of 10th percentile, 25th percentile,
median, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile wages. I construct wage inequality measures,
including the ratio of 90th percentile log wages to 10th percentile log wages (90/10), 50th
percentile log wages to 10th percentile log wages (50/10) and 90th percentile log wages to 50th
percentile log wages (90/50).
To summarize the occupational structure of the establishment, I divide all occupations
into one of four mutually exclusive occupational categories based on the grouping used by
Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The first category, which I call “professional” occupations, includes
management, science, legal, education, and health care occupations (SOC codes 11–29). The
second category, which I call “clerical” occupations, includes office and administrative support
occupations as well as sales occupations (SOC codes 41–43). The third category, “production”
occupations, includes construction, installation, production, and transportation occupations (SOC
codes 45–53). Finally, the fourth category, “service” occupations, includes health care support,
food preparation, and maintenance occupations (SOC codes 31–39). In order to more directly
investigate whether high-wage establishments produce using more technology, I turn next to
computer-related occupations, which are categorized under SOC codes 15.11xx. These include
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computer analysts, database administrators, computer support specialists, and other related
occupations.
To summarize the managerial structure of the organization, I construct three variables.
First, I use the share of employees that are in the management SOC category. This measure does
not include supervisors, who are coded in the major occupation with the workers they supervise.
Thus, I also construct a measure for the supervisor share of establishment employment, as well
as a measure for the sum of management and supervisors. Finally, I construct several measures
of span of control. First, I construct the average supervisory span of control, which is defined as
the total number of nonsupervisory employees divided by the total number of supervisors. In
addition, I construct a measure of managerial span of control, which is the number of supervisors
per manager, as well as total span of control, which is the number of nonsupervisory workers per
the total number of supervisors and managers.

RESULTS
In Figure 3 I plot the kernel density of the distribution of the gap between establishments’
10th percentile wages and median 10th percentile wages. There is substantial variation in the
gap. Due to minimum wage laws and OES methodology that collects wages in bins, we see that
the density is truncated to the left, with the smallest establishment wage falling $2.47 below the
median. However, to the right we see 10th percentile wages as much as $23.60 per hour above
median 10th percentile wages.3
3
To preserve data confidentiality, these density plots graph the distribution of percentiles of the underlying
distribution. Thus, the minimum value is the 1st percentile score and the maximum value is the 99th percentile
score.
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Although we see substantial variation across establishments in 10th percentile wages, this
could be driven by differences in local labor or product markets. For instance, if establishments
in high-cost-of-living areas pay higher wages, this could mechanically lead to variation in the
distribution of 10th percentile wages. Similarly, if there is variation between industries in
staffing, this could drive differences in 10th percentile wages. Thus, in Figure 4, I reproduce the
plot from Figure 3 (in blue) but add two additional plots. First, I calculate the gap between each
establishment’s 10th percentile wage and the median 10th percentile wage for the commuting
zone, plotting the density in red. The gap to commuting zone median smooths out the
distribution and reduces the truncation on the left, with a largest negative wage gap of $4.64
below commuting zone median. However, we still see substantial variation in wages, with the
largest wage gap of $23.71. The overall shape of the distribution is quite similar to the
nonadjusted data. This suggests that geography is unlikely to be able to explain much of the
variation in 10th percentile wages.
Second, I calculate the gap between each establishment’s 10th percentile wage and the
median 10th percentile wage for the six-digit NAICS industry, plotting the density in green. Here
we see a bigger change compared to the raw data, with substantially more weight of the density
close to the zero and less weight in the tails. Nonetheless, we still see extreme values, with the
smallest wage gap of $8.01 below median industry wage and the largest positive wage gap of
$21.00. Thus, while we expect industry can account for more of the variation in 10th percentile
wages across establishments than commuting zones, there still remains substantial unexplained
variation in wages.
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VARIATION IN WAGES WITHIN AND BETWEEN CELLS
Before examining heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments, I first more
formally quantify how much of the variation in 10th percentile wages can be explained by fixed
characteristics of establishments. In particular, I consider geography (commuting zone), industry
(six-digit NAICS), and establishment size (nine categories defined above). In addition, I consider
nonparametrically defined industry by commuting zone cells, which allows for distinct local
averages for industries in different geographic areas, as well as industry by commuting zone by
establishment size.
Table 3 shows the fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages that can be accounted
for by these fixed effects. Since I am interested in the maximal share of the variation that can be
attributed to these fixed effects, I report the unadjusted R-squared, which provides a larger
estimate than the R-squared that has been adjusted for the number of regressors. I include three
sets of specifications. First, I include all establishments to include the largest sample (91,673
establishments). However, this leads to many industry by commuting zone cells with only one
member, leading to an artificially high R-squared statistic. In the second column, I restrict the
sample to establishments in industry by commuting zones with cells of at least three members,
which cuts the sample to 49,578 establishments. Finally, in the last column I restrict the sample
to establishments in cells of at least 10, which leaves a sample of 15,690.
In the first row, we see that common variation within commuting zones can account for at
most 7 percent of the variation in 10th percentile wages. In contrast, in the second row we see
that industries have more explanatory power, accounting for up to 30 percent of the variation.
This is consistent with the density graphs in Figures 3 and 4, which show a substantial fraction of
the variation in wages remaining after controlling for industry. In the third row, I investigate the
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role of establishment size. Although establishment size has been closely linked with wages (see,
for instance, Troske [1999]), size has little explanatory power in accounting for wages at the
bottom of the wage distribution, explaining at most 0.4 percent.
I next turn to nonparametrically defined cells, which are defined as industry by
commuting zone cells. These cells can account for substantially more of the variation, with as
much as 60 percent of the variation in 10th percentile wages in the set of all establishments.
However, many of these cells have only one member, which artificially inflates the unadjusted
R-squared. If we instead consider the adjusted R-squared, it falls to 26 percent. When I instead
restrict the data to cells that have at least 3 or 10 members, the gap between the unadjusted and
adjusted R-squared is reduced. Thus, a conservative estimate is that about half of the variation in
10th percentile establishment wages can be accounted for by industry and commuting zone cells.
In Appendix Table A2, I show that industry by geographic cells can account for at most 60
percent of the variation across a wide variety of wage statistics.
Finally, for completeness, I include cells defined as industry by commuting zone by
establishment size bin. These more narrowly defined cells can explain a larger fraction of 10th
percentile wages than industry and commuting zone alone. However, since more productive
establishments may be able to grow larger, for my preferred specifications I do not condition on
establishment size.
These results indicate that, although there are substantial commonalities in pay within
industries, a significant fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs within narrowly
defined industry by geography cells. This motivates the next section of the paper, in which I
investigate how the wage and occupational structure differs across low- and high-wage
establishments within these industry by geography cells.
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COMPARING ESTABLISHMENTS
Now that I have established that a substantial fraction of the variation in 10th percentile
wages remains after controlling for narrowly defined industry by geographic cells, I explore
other characteristics that are correlated with paying comparatively low or comparatively high
wages within these narrowly defined cells. What could be driving such heterogeneity? I focus on
two distinct explanations: differences in compensation practices and differences in productivity.
Suppose low- and high-wage establishments are equally productive but high-wage
establishments choose to share a larger fraction of the profits with workers. In this case, we
should not see any systematic differences in the organizational structure of low- and high-wage
establishments. This is the ideal scenario for minimum wage legislation, since low-wage
establishments have enough of a profit margin to be able to afford to raise wages without
requiring any reorganization or disemployment effects.
Alternatively, there could be substantive productivity differences between low- and highwage establishments. The source of heterogeneity that I focus on in this paper is the occupational
structure. If high-wage establishments organize production to have more employees performing
high-skilled tasks or use more technology, this may indicate that low-wage establishments will
need to reorganize to adapt to minimum wage increases.
However, there are other sources of productivity differences that I cannot disentangle
from this data set. For instance, if high-wage establishments pay high wages in order to employ
more productive employees, or if the higher wages induce more effort via efficiency wages,
these establishments may be more productive. Each case has opposite implications for minimum
wage legislation. If high-wage establishments employ the best workers, the scarcity of talent will
prevent low-wage establishments from emulating high-wage establishments, making it difficult
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for these low-wage establishments to adapt in response to a high-minimum wage. On the other
hand, if high wages serve as efficiency wages, any low-wage worker could become more
productive if given access to higher wages. For instance, if a living wage allows individuals to
afford stable transportation and child care, this could lead to increased productivity.
It is worth emphasizing that the analysis rests on the assumption that these establishments
are operating in the same product and labor markets. I argue that this is reasonable, since sixdigit industry codes are quite specific. For instance, my analysis looks at differences between
low- and high-wage limited service restaurants in Chicago. Although there may be substantial
product differentiation, these establishments are producing similar enough products that it is
reasonable to believe low-wage establishments could emulate the production process of highwage establishments, and if low-wage establishments left the market, consumers could be
expected to substitute to other such establishments.

HETEROGENEITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN LOW- AND
HIGH-WAGE ESTABLISHMENTS
Next, I compare wage statistics and occupational structure parameters between low- and
high-wage establishments. As explained in the methodology section, I define low-wage
establishments as those that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within their industry by
commuting zone cell. That is, I compare characteristics between low- and high-wage
establishments that are close substitutes—as close as possible—in the labor and product market.
Wage Structure of Establishments
In Table 4, I first examine various wage statistics. In the first row, we see that low-wage
establishments pay 10th percentile wages that are 0.4 log points less than high-wage
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establishments, which represents a difference of about 36 percent, or over $4 less per hour. Of
course, since low-wage establishments are defined as those with below-median 10th percentile
wages, they will mechanically pay lower 10th percentile wages. More interesting is the
difference in wages between low- and high-wage establishments for higher-paid workers. At the
25th percentile wage, low-wage establishments pay about 30 percent less, which falls to 28
percent less at the 50th percentile wage, 26 percent at the 75th percentile wage, and only 21
percent less at the 90th percentile wage. Thus, although low-wage establishments pay lower
wages to workers throughout the establishment hierarchy, the relative gap in wages lessens for
individuals further up the wage hierarchy.
This is evident when we examine establishment wage inequality statistics. Here we see
that the ratio of 90th percentile to 10th percentile log wages is 1.35 for high-wage establishments
but 1.5 for low-wage establishments. Thus, although low-wage establishments pay lower wages
throughout the hierarchy, their higher-wage workers are comparatively well paid, leading to
more unequal wages. For both low- and high-wage establishments, the 90-50 ratio is larger than
the 50-10 ratio, indicating that inequality is somewhat steeper at the top of the hierarchy
compared to the bottom.
These results indicate that establishments do not appear to pay low wages to their bottom
10 percent of employees because they are transferring rents across workers within the
establishment. Since even the highest paid individuals are paid less at low-wage establishments,
it indicates that, if there are no productivity differences between low- and high-wage
establishments, owners are earning more rents from workers throughout the hierarchy.
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Occupational Structure of Establishments
Now that I have shown that there are wage differences between low- and high-wage
establishments that permeate the whole organizational hierarchy, I turn to measures that can
capture differences in the production process between low- and high-wage establishments. As
discussed in the methodology section, I focus on the occupational distribution. Occupations
provide a description of the tasks performed in the establishment, so examining differences in the
shares of occupations provides a measure of the heterogeneity in how production is organized.
In Table 5, I compare occupational structures between low- and high-wage
establishments. In the first row we see that while professional occupations comprise 32–34
percent of total employment in high-wage establishments, low-wage establishments employ 13
percentage points fewer. This represents a 38 percent difference. On the other hand, in all other
occupational categories, low-wage establishments employ a larger share than high-wage
establishments. Figure 5 shows these differences.
Thus, even though these establishments operate in the same local area (commuting zone)
and produce in the same narrowly defined industry (six-digit NAICS by commuting zone cells),
establishments that pay low wages to the bottom 10 percent of their employees produce using
employees who perform a substantially different distribution of tasks, as measured by the
occupational distribution.
What can we learn about these low-wage establishments’ production process from the
fact that they employ approximately 40 percent fewer individuals in professional occupations?
Professional occupations include a variety of white-collar, cognitive-type occupations. These
include management, business, and financial occupations, as well as engineers, scientists, skilled
medical professionals, educators, and legal occupations. These occupations are primarily staffed
with skilled individuals with specialized education. Thus, if establishments employ fewer
18

professional occupations, it indicates that they are organized to use labor that is lower skilled and
less trained, suggesting that these establishments may be less productive.4
In addition, I examine whether low-wage establishments produce using less technology.
As an indirect measure, I examine computer-related occupations, which are categorized under
SOC codes 15.11xx. These include computer analysts, database administrators, computer support
specialists, and other related occupations. If an establishment employs individuals in these
occupations, it is an indicator that the production process in the establishment utilizes relatively
more technology. There is evidence that at least in certain circumstances, adoption of IT can
improve establishment productivity (see, for example, Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007;
Bresnahan et al. 2002). Nonetheless, since I am focusing on service sector establishments, on
average I expect the take-up of these occupations to be relatively low. Indeed, in the summary
statistics we see that, on average, these occupations comprise at most 3 percent of employment in
establishments in this sector.
The last rows of Table 5 show that, on average, 3–4 percent of employment in high-wage
establishments is in computer occupations, depending on the sample. By contrast, low-wage
establishments are comprised of only 1–2 percent computer occupations on average, an
approximately 50 percent lower share of computer occupations. Thus, although these
occupations comprise a relatively small share of total service sector employment, establishments
that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within industry by commuting zone cells have
substantially fewer of these IT workers. This suggests that low-wage establishments produce
using a less technology-intensive production process compared with high-wage establishments.
4

Another possible explanation for the differences in occupational structure is outsourcing. If high-wage
establishments are high-wage because they have outsourced the low-wage jobs, this could lead these establishments
to have relatively fewer service, clerical, and production occupations, and relatively more professional and
management occupations.
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Management Structure of Establishments
Now that I have shown that low- and high-wage establishments operate using a
substantially distinct wage and occupational structures in the same market, I next turn to the
management structure. There are several reasons why the management structure may vary
between low- and high-wage establishments. First, if an establishment is more centralized, we
would expect to see a narrower span of control, since managers are exerting more control over
their subordinates (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). If employees sort between
establishments, we would expect the high-wage establishments in the commuting zone to be able
to employ higher-ability workers, who in turn are more likely to be able to perform more
independently. Second, if managers sort between establishments, we would expect high-wage
establishments to employ higher-skill managers, who in turn can supervise a wider span of
control (Ortín‐Ángel and Salas‐Fumás 2002). Thus, both theories predict that high-wage
establishments should have wider span of control. I first investigate differences in establishment
size between low- and high-wage establishments and then turn to measures of supervisor and
manager share of employment and measures of span of control.
In Table 6, I show that the average high-wage establishment has between 33 and 38
employees, depending on the sample. However, low-wage establishments have 7–10 additional
employees compared to high-wage establishments, depending on the sample. This means within
the same industry by commuting zone cell, low-wage service sector establishments are
approximately 20 percent larger than high-wage establishments. This result is surprising and
stands in stark contrast to a substantial literature that shows that larger employers tend to pay
higher wages (Troske 1999). One possible explanation is that low-wage establishments employ a
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higher share of part-time labor, which would inflate the employment numbers. This result
warrants further investigation.
Next, I examine the share of managers and supervisors. I define managers as occupations
coded in the management two-digit SOC group. Managers are contained within the broader
group of professional occupations, which we saw were a substantially smaller share of
employment in low-wage firms compared with high-wage firms. In contrast, supervisors are
lower-level management positions, and are categorized with the occupation they directly
supervise; thus, these individuals are contained within the service, clerical, or production
occupational categories.
While managers comprise 10 percent of high-wage establishment employment, low-wage
establishments are only 8 percent managers. This is smaller than the gap we see for professional
occupations more broadly. On the other hand, when we examine the supervisor share, there are
only slightly more supervisors in low-wage establishments compared with high-wage
establishments.
Next, I examine measures of span of control, which is a way of summarizing the
management structure of an occupation. It is defined as the number of subordinates per
managerial worker. We can divide each establishment into a three-level hierarchy. At the bottom
are all the employees who are neither supervisors nor managers, in the middle are all the
supervisory workers and at the top are all the managerial workers. Thus, we can define three
measures of span: 1) the ratio of the bottom level to the sum of the two top levels (supervisors +
managers), 2) the ratio of the bottom level to the middle level, and 3) the ratio of the middle level
to the top level.
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We see that low-wage establishments have wider spans of control across all three
measures. For both low-wage and high-wage establishments, the span of control is widest for
supervisors (11–12 for high-wage, 15–16 for low-wage) and substantially lower for supervisors
to managers (0.8 for high-wage, 1.0 for low-wage). Thus, on average, there are more managers
than supervisors in high-wage establishments, compared with parity in low-wage establishments.
However, for both measures, we see that low-wage establishments have span measures that are
approximately 25–33 percent larger.
Thus, low-wage establishments are larger but also more bottom heavy, with more
nonmanagerial workers, slightly more supervisors, and substantially fewer managers. This
reflects the wider spans of control for managers and supervisors, in which each managerial
worker is responsible (on average) for overseeing more employees. Despite this wider span of
control, in Table A3 I show that managers in low-wage establishments are also paid substantially
less than managers in high-wage establishments.
In contrast to theories of optimal hierarchy based on managerial talent, supervisors and
managers in low-wage establishments both supervise wider spans of control and are lower paid.
In contrast to theories of optimal hierarchy based on decentralization, we see wider spans of
control at low-wage establishments, which, if individuals sort between establishments, are more
likely to be staffed by less-skilled individuals.
One possible explanation for this anomalous result is that low-wage establishments may
employ a larger share of part-time workers, which cannot be distinguished in the OES data. If
this is the case, supervisors at low-wage establishments may be able to supervise a larger number
of subordinates without additional managerial effort or talent. Nonetheless, we also see that there
are more supervisors per managers at low-wage establishments. If this were due to more part-
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time supervisors, we would expect to see supervisors comprise a substantially larger share of
employment at low-wage establishments, which is not the case. Thus, while part-time work may
explain some of the differences in span of control measures between low-wage and high-wage
establishments, there are likely additional factors at play.

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have documented that over half of the variation in 10th percentile wages
occurs within narrowly defined industry and geographic cells. I find that establishments that pay
below-median 10th percentile wages for the cell pay lower wages to all workers and are more
unequal. These wage results indicate that establishments that pay low wages to their bottom
decile are not simply transferring rents between employees.
Instead, I find evidence that these establishments produce using a substantively different
production process—namely, employing a smaller share of professional occupation and IT
occupations. This is suggestive evidence that these low-wage establishments may pay lower
wages in part because they are less productive overall. If this is true, adapting to increases in the
minimum wage may require more than simply reducing profits. If it is relatively easy for these
establishments to mimic high-wage establishments, we may see minimum wage increases spur
these establishments to modify their production process, potentially increasing their productivity
overall.
However, it may be difficult for establishments to modify their productivity. For instance,
if high-wage establishments are more productive because they employ higher-skill employees,
scarcity of talent in the labor market will prevent low-wage establishments from simply hiring
higher-skill employees. In addition, the occupational structure may reflect investment in a
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particular production process or organizational structure, which may be difficult to change. In
these cases, we are more likely to see establishment exit in response to minimum wage increases.
Although there is little evidence that establishments have exited in response to past
minimum wage increases (Belman and Wolfson 2015), this will depend on the magnitude of the
minimum wage increase as well as market conditions. Nonetheless, my results suggest that these
affected establishments are more likely to be selected from the less-productive tail of the
establishment distribution. Thus, even if minimum wage increases are large enough to induce
firm exit, such exit is more likely to serve as a mechanism for creative destruction, opening up
the market for entry or expansion by higher-productivity firms.
Although this paper is descriptive, several conclusions may be useful for economic
development policy. First, for local areas considering implementing a local minimum wage
ordinance, a reasonable target would be a minimum wage that is low enough that some
establishments within narrowly defined industries (such as limited service restaurants) already
pay wages above the threshold. This ensures that the wage is sustainable and allows employers to
have a reasonable opportunity for adjustment. Second, since any minimum wage increase has the
possibility of causing firms to reorganize or shut down, policymakers should be prepared to offer
targeted retraining, job search assistance, or other active labor market policies to individuals
employed in industries that are more likely to be affected. This can help minimize the cost of
adjustment falling most heavily on the low-wage individuals who were intended to benefit from
the higher wages.
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Table 1 List of Service Sector Industries (two-digit NAICS)
NAICS

Industry group

22

Utilities

48

Transportation

49

Warehousing

51

Information

52

Finance and Insurance

53

Real Estate Rental and Leasing

54

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

55

Management of Companies and Enterprises

56

Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services

61

Educational Services

62

Health Care and Social Assistance

71

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation

72

Accommodation and Food Services

81

Other Services (except Public Administration)

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table 2 Summary Statistics

Mean

Cell >=10
SD
p10

p90

Mean

Cell >=3
SD
p10

p90

Mean

10th ptile. wage

13.52

7.81

8.07

21.14

13.11

7.20

8.07

21.14

12.84

6.71

50th ptile. wage

21.10

16.05

8.57

43.27

19.98

14.26

8.54

34.15

19.30

90th ptile. wage

43.89

38.20

13.15

88.10

40.54

34.90

13.15

88.10

38.59

Total emp.

39.42

178.05

5.00

69.00

34.32

172.57

5.00

69.00

Mgr. share

0.10

0.11

0.00

0.23

0.10

0.11

0.00

Sup. share

0.05

0.07

0.00

0.14

0.05

0.07

Computer share

0.03

0.14

0.00

0.03

0.03

0.12

Prof. share

0.32

0.35

0.00

0.88

0.30

Service share

0.43

0.42

0.00

1.00

Clerical share

0.21

0.28

0.00

Production share

0.05

0.16

0.00

Observations
Span

17.43

12.26

21.83

Observations
Non-sup. to sup.
Sup. to mgrs.
Observations

21.14

13.08

8.54

34.15

32.86

13.15

69.01

30.78

151.93

5.00

55.00

0.23

0.10

0.11

0.00

0.23

0.00

0.14

0.05

0.07

0.00

0.15

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.34

0.00

0.87

0.29

0.34

0.00

0.86

0.38

0.41

0.00

1.00

0.34

0.41

0.00

1.00

0.67

0.24

0.29

0.00

0.73

0.25

0.29

0.00

0.75

0.10

0.08

0.21

0.00

0.31

0.11

0.25

0.00

0.57

1.00

15.00

2.50

22.00

0.00

2.00

49,578
0.91

16.00

7.37

14.57

2.60

23.75

11.55

18.65

13,008

Observations

1.85

91,673
1.00

15.25

7.11

13.14

2.50

23.00

11.08

16.94

40,197

8,612
0.83

70,871

26,739
0.00

p90

8.07

15,690
7.82

All establishments
SD
p10

2.00

0.81

10,785

1.77
32,778

46,525
0.00

2.00

0.79

1.72
55,974

NOTE: Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in the same commuting zone. The span of control
is the ratio of nonmanagerial employment to managers, while non-sup. to sup. is the ratio of nonmanagerial employment to
supervisors and sup. to mgrs. is the ratio of supervisors to managers.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

29

Table 3 R-Squared from Fixed Effect Regressions on 10th Percentile Establishment Wages
Specification:

All establishments
R-sq.
Adj-R sq.

Comm. zone FE

0.068

0.060

0.070

0.059

0.068

0.061

Industry FE

0.265

0.262

0.282

0.278

0.304

0.299

Est. size FE

0.002

0.002

0.003

0.003

0.004

0.004

Industry × comm. zone FE

0.608

0.260

0.514

0.410

0.421

0.384

Industry × comm. zone × Est. size FE
Observations

0.785

0.153

0.727

0.369

0.609

91,673

Cells >=3
R-sq.
Adj-R sq.

49,578

Cells >=10
R-sq.
Adj-R sq.

0.421
15,690

NOTE: Each entry reports the R-squared and adjusted R-square from a separate regression. Specifications include industry,
commuting zone, and establishment size fixed effects. Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in
the same commuting zone.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table 4 Wage Differences between Low- and High-Wage Establishments
Dependent variable
10th percentile wages

Independent var.

Cell >=10

Low-wage est.
Constant

25th percentile wages

Constant
50th percentile wages

Low-wage est.

Low-wage est.

Low-wage est.

Constant
90-10 ratio

(0.00)

−0.35***

−0.034***

(0.02)

(0.01)

Low-wage est.

(0.00)

−0.33***

−0.031***

(0.02)

(0.01)
(0.00)

−0.30***

−0.026***

(0.02)

(0.01)
(0.00)

−0.24***

−0.22***

(0.03)

(0.01)
(0.00)

−9.48***

−8.29***

(0.60)

(0.37)

26.08***

24.27***

(0.10)

(0.06)

1.35***
0.05***
(0.01)

Constant

1.20***
(0.00)

50-10 ratio

Low-wage est.

0.07***
(0.00)

Constant

1.12***
(0.00)

Observations

3.44***

(0.00)

0.15***

Low-wage est.

3.13***

(0.00)

(0.00)
90-50 ratio

2.88***

(0.00)

(0.01)
Constant

2.68***

(0.00)

3.50***

Low-wage est.

2.56***

(0.00)

3.18***

Constant
Average wage

(0.01)

2.92***

Constant
90th percentile wages

−0.042***

(0.02)

2.71***

Constant
75th percentile wages

−0.44***
2.59***

Low-wage est.

Cell>=3

15,690

0.15***
(0.01)
1.35***
(0.00)
0.05***
(0.00)
1.20***
(0.00)
0.07***
(0.00)
1.12***
(0.00)
49,578

NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at
the commuting zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5 Occupational Distribution
Dependent variable
Professional share

Independent var.
Low-wage est.
Constant

Cell >=10

Cell>=3

−0.13***

−0.11***

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.34***
(0.00)

Service share

Low-wage est.

0.04***
(0.01)

Constant

0.42***
(0.00)

Clerical share

Low-wage est.

0.06***
(0.01)

Constant

0.20***
(0.00)

Production share

Low-wage est.

0.03***
(0.00)

Constant
Computer occupations share

0.04***

Low-wage est.
Constant

0.04***
(0.01)
0.38***
(0.00)
0.05***
(0.00)
0.23***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
0.07***

(0.00)

(0.00)

−0.02***

−0.02***

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.04***

Observations

0.32***
(0.00)

0.03***

(0.00)

(0.00)

15,690

49,578

NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at
the commuting zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table 6 Management Structure
Dependent variable
Total employment

Independent var.
Low-wage est.
Constant

Cell >=10
7.11***

Cell>=3
10.08***

(2.38)

(1.96)

38.19***

32.77***

0.41
Observations
Manager share

Low-wage est.
Constant

15,690

Supervisor share

Low-wage est.

−0.02***

(0.01)

(0.00)

0.10***
15,690
0.004
(0.00)

Constant

0.05***
(0.00)

Observations
Span (all nonmanagers to managers)

Low-wage est.
Constant

15,690

Sup. span (all nonmanagers to supervisors)

Low-wage est.
Constant
Observations

Manager span (supervisors to managers)

Low-wage est.
Constant

(0.00)
49,578
0.005**
(0.00)
0.05***
(0.00)
49,578
3.13***

0.56

0.3

7.20***

6.89***

13,008

(0.30)
40,197

3.99***

3.41***

0.73

0.44

11.67***

11.06***

(0.11)

(0.06)

8,612

26,739

0.19***

0.25***

0.04

0.04

0.79***

0.77***

(0.01)
Observations

0.10***

3.78***

(0.09)
Observations

49,578

−0.02***

(0.00)
Observations

0.3

10,785

(0.01)
32,778

NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at
the commuting zone level. The number of observations changes with specifications, because not all establishments employ
individuals in management or supervisory occupations.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

33

Figure 1 Commuting Zones in 10-Establishment Cell Sample

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 2 Average 10th Percentile Establishment Wages, by Industry, for 10-Establishment Cell Sample
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 3 Kernel Density of Distance between Establishment 10th Percentile Wage and Median 10th
Percentile Wage for All Establishments

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 4 Kernel Density of Distance between Establishment 10th Percentile Wage and Median 10th
Percentile Wage, for All Establishments, by Commuting Zone, and by Industry

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 5 Distribution of Employment across Occupational Categories
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NOTE: Low-wage establishments indicate establishments that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within industry by
commuting zone cells, for the 10-cell establishment sample.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table A1 May 2016 OES Wage Bins
Hourly wage

Annual salary

Range A

Under $9.25

Under $19,240

Range B

$9.25–$11.74

$19,240–$24,439

Range C

$11.75–$14.74

$24,440–$30,679

Range D

$14.75–$18.74

$30,680–$38,999

Range E

$18.75–$23.99

$39,000–$49,919

Range F

$24.00–$30.24

$49,920–$62,919

Range G

$30.25–$38.49

$62,920–$80,079

Range H

$38.50–$48.99

$80,080–$101,919

Range I

$49.00–$61.99

$101,920–$128,959

Range J

$62.00–$78.74

$128,960–$163,799

Range K

$78.75–$99.99

$163,800–$207,999

Range L

$100.00 and over

$208,000 and over

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics documentation.
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Table A2 R-Squared for Additional Dependent Variables
All establishments

Cells >=3

Cells >=10

Dependent variable:

R-sq

Adj-R-sq

R-sq

Adj-R-sq

R-sq

Adj-R-sq

10th ptile. wage

0.61

0.26

0.51

0.41

0.42

0.38

25th ptile. wage

0.63

0.30

0.55

0.45

0.47

0.43

50th ptile. wage

0.66

0.35

0.59

0.50

0.52

0.49

75th ptile. wage

0.67

0.38

0.60

0.51

0.54

0.51

90th ptile. wage

0.70

0.44

0.63

0.55

0.60

0.57

Average wage

0.73

0.49

0.67

0.60

0.63

0.61

90-10 ratio

0.63

0.30

0.53

0.42

0.47

0.44

90-50 ratio

0.58

0.21

0.45

0.33

0.37

0.33

50-10 ratio

0.61

0.27

0.49

0.39

0.42

0.38

Manager share

0.62

0.29

0.48

0.37

0.39

0.35

Supervisor share

0.61

0.27

0.45

0.34

0.33

0.29

Computer occs. share

0.77

0.56

0.73

0.68

0.70

0.69

Professional share

0.84

0.69

0.79

0.74

0.78

0.77

Service share

0.91

0.83

0.88

0.86

0.87

0.86

Clerical share

0.82

0.66

0.76

0.70

0.70

0.68

Production share

0.87

0.76

0.75

0.69

0.51

0.48

Total employment

0.31

-0.29

0.25

0.09

0.14

0.09

Observations

91,673

49,578

15,690

NOTE: Each entry reports the R-squared and adjusted R-square from a separate regression. All specifications include industry by
commuting zone fixed effects. Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in the same commuting
zone.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table A3 Wages for Subgroups of Occupations
Dependent variable
10th ptile. mgmt. wages

Independent var.
Low-wage est.

Cells >=10
−0.16***
(0.03)

Constant

3.22***
(0.00)

Observations
10th ptile. non-mgmt. wages

Low-wage est.

13,008
−0.42***
(0.02)

Constant

2.58***
(0.00)

Observations
10th ptile. low-wage occs.

Low-wage est.

10,767
−0.23***
(0.02)

Constant

2.51***
(0.00)

Observations
10th ptile. mid-wage occs.

Low-wage est.

13,335
−0.34***
(0.02)

Constant

2.72***
(0.01)

Observations
10th ptile. high-wage occs.

Low-wage est.

13,335
−0.15***
(0.03)

Constant

3.32***
(0.01)

Observations

12,095

NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. Each dependent variable is defined as the 10th percentile wage
among individuals employed in the occupation of interest within the establishment. Low-wage occupations are defined as the five
major occupations with lowest median wages (Healthcare support, Food Preparation and Serving Related, Building and Grounds
Cleaning and Maintenance, Personal Care and Service, Sales and Related, Farming, Fishing, and Forestry), high-wage
occupations are the five major occupations with the highest median wages (Management, Business and Financial, Computer and
Math, Architecture and Engineering, Life, Physical, and Social Sciences, and Legal), and mid-wage occupations are the balance.
All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. The number of observations
changes with specifications, because not all establishments employ individuals in all occupational categories.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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